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The Developmental Social Contract and Basic Income in Denmark 
 
Abstract 
 
/Ŷ ƚŚŝƐ ƉĂƉĞƌ / ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐ ǁŚǇ ƐƚĞƉƐ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ďĂƐŝĐ ŝŶĐŽŵĞ  ?ĨƌŽŵ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ? ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂƚĞ ĂƌĞ ƉůĂƵƐŝďůĞ ŝŶ
ĞŶŵĂƌŬ ?ǇĞƚƚŚŝƐ ‘ŝŶƐŝĚĞ-ŽƵƚ ?ƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶŝƐĐŽŶƚĞƐƚĞĚŝŶĂŶŝƐŚƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? I argue that implementation 
since the 1990s of the flexicurity regime  W labour flexibility with social transfers and training - has 
stretched the developmental tradition that historically has fed the case for broadly inclusive 
reforms. Historically, incorporating stratifications linked with developmentalism have supported 
attained high equality in Nordic states. This Equality Paradox may explain why rising inequality in 
Denmark (and other countries) makes a case for basic income but the source of this inequality  W 
neo-liberalism - also puts it at risk. The developmental rights tradition in Denmark helped cushion 
the inherent instability and punitive tendency of the flexicurity model. Yet flexicurity also corroded 
developmentalism, generating a complicated scenario for basic income reform.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Taking Denmark as my example, in this paper I argue conceptualizing the Nordic welfare state in 
developmental egalitarian terms aids in clarifying the political status of basic income in the Nordic 
context.  ĚŽƉƚŝŶŐĂ ‘ŵĂĐro-ĐŽŶĨŝŐƵƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ, I argue the developmental and rights-bases 
of Nordic welfare states have been under-assumed in favour of labour Wprocess or class-coalition 
models. I argue instead that formation of a broadly incorporating developmental social contract 
tradition has contributed to a high level of social embeddedness of public governance and shaped 
the evolutionary logic of the Danish welfare state. Public sector capabilities linked with 
developmental governance have been the foundation for recurrence of steps towards basic income 
in Denmark. However, neo-liberalisation in the form of flexicurity (Kongshøj-Madsen 2003) entails 
recent partial transitions to basic income from within the public sector can go in different directions. 
Below, I first briefly situate the Danish case within the contemporary discussion of basic income and 
the Nordic model. I then look critically at the conceptualisation of the Nordic model in comparative 
typology literatures. Next, I argue a developmental form of egalitarianism helped cushion inherent 
punitive tendencies within the flexicurity model, yet flexicurity remains unstable.  Last I discuss how 
this complicated scenario explains the catalytic role of basic income, as alternative responses to 
exhaustion of flexicurity have impacts are likely to shape how the direction of social incorporation in 
Denmark is changed. 
 
 
i. Basic Income and Social Democracy 
 
In the core literature, basic income can appear to be presented as an alternative to Nordic-style 
social democracy. In his classic work, vP defined his project  against   ‘ǁĞůĨĂƌŝƐƚŽƌŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ-ŽƌŝĞŶƚĞĚ ?
(n.30, 248, 28) models, and social democracy as the pursuit oĨ  ‘ƚŚĞ ĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ ƚŽ ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞ ?  ? ? ? ) ? 
Labour unions are often portrayed as linked with outdated welfare arrangements (Vanderborght 
2006, Vanderborght and van Parijs 2017, van Parijs 2017), and social democracy has been placed at 
the forefront of a paternalist push for all individuals to labour  (Standing 1999, 2014, 15-16).  At the 
level of discourse, the argument that basic income conflicts with the Nordic model is not 
unreasonable. Although a surprisingly large share - about half - of Europeans surveyed in recent 
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opinion polls claim to be positively inclined towards basic income, scepticism is more marked in 
Nordic countries (European Social Survey 2017, Figure 1). 
 
Yet, analysing Nordic welfare state institutions in more general terms as governance systems 
presents a more complex picture. Our understanding of the status of basic income today depends 
greatly on how broadly we contextualise the proposal. At one level, I argue we can characterise the 
emergence of steps towards basic income in Denmark as a response to the exhaustion of 
dysfunctional regimes to sanction the unemployed that emerged in the course of the 2000s. 
However, the forces at work are politically complex. TŚĞ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚ ƚŽ  ‘ŵŝǆ ? ƚŚĞ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ĂŶĚ
developmental traditions with a punitive regime that violates important personal freedoms led to 
sanctions being called into question, and partial steps to basic income coming about. Yet, if the 
developmental tradition thus came to the aid of basic income, will basic income come to the aid of 
the tradition that historically brought universal ideals such as linked with basic income into being?  
 
To answer this kind of question we need to move beyond the descriptive focus on individual 
institutions and sectors of the evolutionary literature.  tĞ ŚĂǀĞ ƚŽ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ĐŽŶǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ ? ŽĨ
ŽŶĞŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?ůŝŬĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ )ŵĂǇŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇƐƉĞůů ‘ĚŝƐƉůĂĐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?dŚĞůĞŶĂŶĚ^ƚƌĞĞĐŬ
2005,19) of the mode of governing  W in this case the competition economy - that brought the 
offending policy  W sanctions - about. In this context, partial steps to basic income may be playing 
midwife to the gestation of a bureaucratically simplified competition economy. In sum, the 
emergence of flexicurity, leading to sanctions, represents in reality a struggle within the Danish state 
between two very differently modes of governance - developmental or through the market. It is 
when we understand the Danish welfare state as a resilient but increasingly strained developmental 
governance system that we can see how steps towards basic income in Denmark today are fraught 
with tension.  
 
 
ii. The  Developmental Social Contract and the Danish Welfare State 
 
The Danish welfare state is recognized to share features with the Anglo-liberal type, although 
inclusion in basic universal schemes in both cases amount to very different welfare models, with 
punitive benefits in the second case, but not the first (Esping-Andersen 1990, 25-28; Kildal and 
Kuhlne 2005, 20). Pinning down what universalism in practice entails is difficult (Kildal and Kuhlne 
2005 17-19; Christensen 2015). Below I will discuss how models of social incorporation can help by 
showing how combinations of schemes drawn along the lines of pure universalism and 
developmental stratification reinforce each other in raising the level of social inclusion.  
 
As set out in Figure 2, the Nordic welfare model emerges through a range of different incorporating 
movements under the aegis of the state. In the Nordic region, the kind of systemic vulnerability Tilly 
(1985, 1990) has linked with the formation of centralised European states combined with egalitarian 
social traditions to generate conditions in which over time Nordic states became heavily embedded 
in society. From the seventeenth century, paternalist bonds between kings and peasantry forged 
during successive rounds of military conscription (Jensen 1936, 5, 280-340) were reinforced through 
land reform to circumvent aristocratic power (Jensen 1936, 129; Sandberg 1979, 240). Revisiting of 
rural property boundaries (Nothing, 1926), along with emergent public regulation of rural labour 
(Hvid 2016, 557), cemented a socially embedded form of public authority and legal tradition 
(Jonassen 1983, 34-5). Denmark was one of the first states in Europe to institute universal public 
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education, in 1914, pushed by an emergent education movement in the country-side across the 
Nordic region (Sandberg 1979, 225-226).  
 
Hence, public incorporation of Nordic society abated competitive forces before capitalism proper 
set in. dŚĞƐƚĂƚĞƐƵďƐŝĚŝǌĞĚǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚĨĂƌŵĞƌĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞƐ (Chang 2009; Kananen 
2014, 36-48, 50), and shaped emerging labour market institutions through occupational policies. 
,ĞŶĐĞ ? ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ? ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ǁĞƌĞ ŶŽƚ- as in the US (Thelen 2004, Archer 2007), shaped 
exclusively through direct engagement with capital. The Danish social democratic party emerging in 
the 1870s did not create or represent the whole of the popular democratic tradition.  
 
Advocacy for basic income in Denmark also bear traces of the developmental contract tradition. 
Hohlenberg, who in the 1930s viewed BI as a radical alternative to majoritarian social democracy 
(Birnbaum and Christensen 2007), formed part of a wider folk education movement.   In the 1970s, 
BI was presented as Ă  ‘ƌĞǀŽůƚ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ĐĞŶƚƌĞ ? ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ďĂƐŝƐ ŽĨ ĂŶ ĞŐĂůŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ ŚƵŵĂŶŝƐƚ ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ
(Meyer et al 1978).  
 
Today, a developmental form of social contract in Nordic states can be identified descriptively in two 
features of governing. First, as shown in Graph 1 (a,b), the Danish public finance system entails a 
high level of socialisation, and public spending is resiliently more human development-orientated 
compared with other countries. In addition, Nordic public policy tends to promote equality and 
incorporation along human development dimensions.  Notably, the importance of  ‘ĂŐĞ-related 
social ƌŝƐŬƐ ?in the Nordic model is stressed and related with trust formation by Birnbaum et al 
(2017,4), and with developmental freedom and public property rights in economic stability (Haagh 
2012). Here I argue however both phenomena are a consequence of a wider, dynamic 
developmental governance model that cannot be reduced to parts, static norms, or particular items 
of spending. This model is distinctive not for its focus on age categories as much as the support of 
developmental processes and social relations. High social spending on specific risks is an important 
background factor, but does not explain how the system works or is reproduced. I will argue here 
that adaptation of developmental norms to the reframing of new problems can be shown to 
regenerate developmental governance and expectations through everyday practical reasoning 
within institutions of education, occupation and public administration. The upshot is a form of active 
democratic tension and resistance which in turn can be shown to have had an important role to play 
in recent moves to, and debates about, basic income in Denmark. 
 
To further explain, where market-based rights-obligations structures tend to emphasize job-
readiness, compulsion, punishment and individualised responsibility through direct contracting, 
developmental governance model tends to have a humanistic orientation, in the following three 
senses: The structure of education prioritises personal and social development. The governance of 
contributory expectations emphasizes incentives over exclusions or punishment. And, cooperative 
values and practices tend to be inculcated and governed through socialisation rather than 
compulsion. To exemplify, in the Danish education system, historically, a solidaristic element is 
exemplified in regulation to promote parity in resourcing for students in public and private schools 
(Haagh 2012, Undervisningsministeriet 2004). A humanist element is involved in state intervention 
to delay exams, and suppress competition (Steinmo, 2010, 71), and in an ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽŶ ‘ǁŚŽůĞŶĞƐƐ ?
and the teaching of independence and critical thinking (Loftager 2004, 118-121). Finally, a liberal 
element is perceptible in governance autonomy of schools, and a diverse offering of further 
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education courses. The upshot is, reciprocity in society tends to take a general social and temporal 
(inter-generational, cross-class) rather that direct form. 
 
If then both market and developmental governance have self-reinforcing properties, and stand in 
tension, within individual systems, historically, the Nordic pull more towards the developmental 
logic. Moreover, overall functionality of developmental governance entails this form is more stable. 
After the 1990s, however, changes in social policy in Denmark  W as in other Nordic states, imposed 
by global pressures, entailed a push towards the market model, without abandoning the 
developmental contract model. Next I explore how the focus on developmental governance extends 
on prevailing models of welfare comparison and social incorporation. 
 
 
iii. Comparative Capitalism, Social Incorporation and the Equality Paradox 
 
The extant comparative welfare literature groups states according to how different actors have 
shaped capitalist development. The welfare literature focuses on labour process, and the Varieties 
of Capitalism on the organisation of business. A problem however with an account of modernity as 
thoroughly capitalist is that equating economic formalisation with capitalist development, presents 
an unrealistic idealisation of informal society. In basic income debates this has led to a tendency to 
see basic income as a source of escape from moderŶ  ‘ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ? ? ůĞĂǀŝŶŐ ŽƵƚ ŽĨ ǀŝĞǁ ŚŽǁ ďĂƐŝĐ
income is likely to emerge from within the public sector.  
 
ŶĂŶĂůŽŐŽƵƐƉƌŽďůĞŵŝƐĞǀŝĚĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ĚĞ-ĐŽŵŵŽĚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƵƐĞĚďǇƐƉŝŶŐ-Andersen (EA) to 
set the Nordic states apart. Specifically, there is a disjuncture between how Esping-Andersen 
ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ ƚŚĞ EŽƌĚŝĐ ƚǇƉĞ ? ĂŶĚ ŚŽǁ ŚĞ ĐůĂƐƐĞĚ ŝƚ ? ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ  ?Ɛ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ? ƐŽůŝĚĂƌŝƐƚŝĐ ůĂďŽƵƌ
action (1985, 57-78) and class-coalitions (1990, 16-18)  W e.g. bargaining within production 
(formalisation), explained ƚŚĞ EŽƌĚŝĐ ǁĞůĨĂƌĞ ƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ ĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐĞ ? zĞƚ ? Ă ŚŝŐŚ ĚĞŐƌĞ ŽĨ ĚĞ-
commodification (1990, 21-26), the granting of security outside production, defined its form.  
 
An alternative to thinking of freedom as security outside the formal economy is to enquire how 
individuals attain states of enjoying economic stability through the democratic development of 
shared property rights in multiple sources of security generated within society. Relatedly, Offe 
(1984, 42) suggested Ă ‘ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂůƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇ ?ŝŶŵĂƚƵƌĞĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝsm might bring a basic in come 
ĂďŽƵƚ ĨƌŽŵ  ‘ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ? ƚŚĞ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ?Yet arguably, the tendency in question is not inherent in 
capitalism but in variants where  W as in Nordic states  W public support of human development has 
gained ascendency. This brings into view the role the public sector plays in shaping the direction 
formalisation takes. Hence, Denmark did not become more egalitarian (than Germany) only in the 
1990s as suggested in recent analysis of the Danish case within the Varieties of Capitalism literature 
(Thelen 2014, 9-13). Thelen is right liberalisation (after the 1990s) was more egalitarian in Denmark 
compared with other countries. However, Denmark becomes less egalitarian and more punitive 
compared with the past (Haagh 2001; Torfing 2004; Larsen and Andersen, 2009; Caswell, Larsen and 
Marston 2010). 
 
Accordingly, to explain how developmental incorporation has sustained high social equality in 
Denmark, and recent strain in this model frames the basic income debate today, below I adapt Korpi 
ĂŶĚWĂůŵĞ ?Ɛ(KP) analysis of alternative models of social incorporation. 
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KP sought to explain how  W paradoxically - public pensions systems characterised by inequality 
produced overall equality among pensioners.  They reasoned that bringing social group 
stratifications within the public system ultimately led to more redistribution (the redistribution 
paradox). Accordingly, in Figure 4.a, Diamond No 5  W <W ?Ɛ  ‘ĞŶĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŶŐ ? ŵŽĚĞů ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐ Ă
pension system based in a combination of basic and contributory provision, resulting in high 
coverage, class inclusion, and low inequality.1 ƌŝƚŝĐƐŽĨ<W ?ƐŵŽĚĞůĐůĂŝŵŝƚ ŝƐŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚŝŶ
the sense that, today, the link between targeting and inequality is less clear (Marx et al 2013, Brady 
and Bostic 2013). Yet, critics can say this and be right only because society has changed away from a 
form of social incorporation that promoted stable inclusion towards a labour market based on 
greater income stratifications and precarity. Where inequality in the market is higher, the public 
sector has to work much harder to even it out. This is also Hills (2015, 38) conclusion when he 
ŽďƐĞƌǀĞƐŝƚŝƐƐƚŝůůƚŚĞ ‘ŽǀĞƌĂůůƐĐĂůĞ ?ŽĨǁĞůĨĂƌĞƐƉĞŶĚƚŚĂƚŵĂƚƚĞƌƐĨŽƌƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨƐƉĞŶĚŽŶƐŽĐŝĂů
equality in a given society. 2 My argument is that the only way a scale effect can be (and in Nordic 
states has been) achieved is by promoting equality and developmental security both within and 
outside production. Consequently, I suggest we need to rework the redistribution paradox as a 
broader Equality Paradox: developmental governance is an instrumental factor in translating the 
effect of basic universality in particular schemes into universalism in inclusion or in effect (Figure 3). 
This involves four basic adaptations of <W ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ? 
 
First, a basic distinction needs to be made to interpret KW ?Ɛ ŵŽĚĞů ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ǁĂǇ / ŝŶƚĞŶĚ ?between 
targeting by design and effect. Targeting by design involves means-testing through a particular 
scheme: in theory all are entitled if in a certain situation. Targeting by effect occurs where only 
certain groups enjoy real advantage from a certain scheme - what Esping Andersen referred to as 
 ‘ĨůĂƚ-ƌĂƚĞ ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůŝƐŵ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ). The implication for basic income debates is important, by 
revealing how despite the universal (strict egalitarian) design of the scheme, a basic income may 
operate as an anti-poverty, targeted scheme by effect.  
 
 
                                                        
1 In diamonds 1-4 large chunks of society is left to find informal or private cover. In the case of Diamond 2, the British 
model of public provision, there is universalism, but at a low level.  
2 Hills (40) suggest the erroneous public perception that the poor have become more costly is related to a moral bias 
against supporting working age adults. In reality, it is the stratification in market incomes that has reduced the equality 
effect of public transfers (Hills 44).  
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Consequently, second, to show how  W in the case of Denmark - incorporation works through 
developmental governance, it ŝƐ ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ƚŽ ďƌŽĂĚĞŶ <W ?Ɛ model beyond pensions. Denmark 
introduced an effective two-tier pension system later than other Nordic states, in 1987. However, 
considering the two-tier income insurance model in Denmark (basic assistance and voluntary 
unemployment insurance contributions), dating to 1907, Denmark already had an encompassing 
model of welfare. In addition, the Folk education systems is in effect a two tier system: in countries 
like Denmark and Sweden, private schools charging small fees, yet heavily subsidized by the state (in 
ĞŶŵĂƌŬ ƚŽ ĂƌŽƵŶĚ  ? ? A? ŽĨ ĐŽƐƚƐ ) ? ĂƌĞ ƉƵďůŝĐůǇ  ‘ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĚ ? ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞschools (Haagh 2012). 
Differently shaped two Wtier systems are endemic across human development supporting 
institutions in Nordic states. Indeed it is because this is true that basic income fits well within the 
developmental social contract tradition in Nordic states.  
 
dŚŝƌĚ ?/ƚŚŝŶŬ<W ?ƐŵŽĚĞůǁŽƌŬƐďĞƐƚĂƐĂŶŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŵŽĚĞů ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŚĂƐƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚ
of diluting class. KP argue a feature of Nordic incorporation is that defection is avoided because 
upper classes have the opportunity to pay into systems that protect their market earnings. So 
described however their model is made to sound a bit too much like a (static) class interest calculus.  
Another way of putting their argument is to say citizens in Nordic states are moved to support 
overall universality of outcome through socialisation in developmentally structured shared 
institutions.3 
 
Accordingly, fourth, / ǁĂŶƚ ƚŽ ŵĂŬĞ <W ?Ɛ ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŵŽĚĞů ŵŽƌĞ ĚǇŶĂŵŝĐ ? ďǇ ƐŚŽǁŝŶŐ ŚŽǁ
developmental governance supports universalism in effect over time. Conversely, where 
developmental governance is curtailed, universalism begins to leak. The first, affirmative, 
proposition is that developmental governance supports a positive mutual effect between different 
aspects of freedom within and across the design of different welfare schemes. Developmental 
freedom is broadly the freedom to be secure in life-course terms (Haagh 2007, 2015). Independence 
freedom is the freedom to enjoy security in your own name, as of individual right. Cooperative 
freedom is the freedom to choose affiliation. The Danish (and Finnish) UI systems share certain 
liberal rights features with a basic income institution which speak to these forms of freedom 
combined. Unlike in other European systems, state-backed occupational insurance in Finland and 
Denmark is voluntary. (Indeed it may be no accident that BI experimentation is more advanced in 
Finland and Denmark). Although BI is non-contributory and UI is contributory, both are based on 
individual entitlement unrelated to spousal income and means. Both enhance economic stability: BI 
offers low, permanent security, and UI longer-term, generous, wage compensation. Finally, BI 
supports autonomy of action, UI voluntarism in contribution. In all, both BI and UI  W though different 
- compare favourably with contemporary means-tested basic assistance schemes along dimensions 
of  W simultaneously -respect for individual and developmental status of persons. My point here is, 
this human-centredness in design and effect of welfare transfers is rarely achieved through a single 
scheme.  
 
                                                        
3 In support of this, attitudes ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇĂƌĞŵŽƌĞ ‘ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚ ? ?coherent across dimensions) in Nordic states 
(Svallfors 2006, 69, 163, 2007, 216-7). Greve (2017) reports a shift in Denmark during a period of rising inequality, from 
preferences for low taxes to better services. In 1994 about half of all Danes want lower taxes, and slightly less want op 
better services. By 2015 this ratio shifts to one-thid for lower taxes,  against two-thirds who want better public services. 
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BI advocates often argue against public subsidy of the UI system, given the more generous level of 
UI compared with basic (non-contributory) security. In simple fairness terms they have a point. 
However, public subsidy of the UI system has not only enabled redistribution within the UI system.4 
In addition, through interstate comparison we can surmise a more secure occupational system  W 
attained through standards, wage bargaining, and income-related insurance (UI) - has the effect of 
 ‘ůŝĨƚŝŶŐ ? ƚŚĞ ďĂƐĞ ?5 In the 2000s, Denmark and Britain both had the most generous level of basic 
assistance in the EU relative to the lowest wages. But in Denmark the level of both are much higher 
than in the UK (Haagh 2012, 575).6 The period in which Denmark came closest to a BI scheme  W e.g. 
when administration of basic assistance was most lax, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, coincided 
with the height of affiliation to occupational schemes. Accordingly, in Diamonds 6 and 7 in Figure 4.b 
I suggest a resilient (if strained) model of Developmental Equality has obtained in Denmark and 
other Nordic states. 7  A basic income could play a pivoting  W system stabilising  W role in 
consolidating such as model today, under certain conditions. For example, presence of more 
developmental security systems makes it likely different groups benefit in a real way from basic 
income. Individuals and institutions can plan to combine basic income and other schemes 
(sabbaticals might be negotiated if unions are stronger, for instance). KEEP8  
 
However, we also see a reversed effect. Looking at incorporation models over time, we can surmise 
that corrosion of developmental forms of governing imperils incorporation in both so-called liberal 
(Anglo-Saxon) and social democratic (Nordic) models.   ‘>eakage ? results from corrosion, when 
barriers to entitlement entail persons drop out of formal systems of work or income support.  
 
Next I discuss how resilient elements of developmental governance have worked to contain this 
form of leakage in Denmark, yet the practice of flexicurity has corroded developmental governance, 
generating a complicated backdrop for the debate about BI reform.  
 
 
iv. tĞůĨĂƌĞĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƵĂůŝƐŵŝŶĞŶŵĂƌŬ P&ůĞǆŝĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?^ĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂů ‘ZĞďŽƵŶĚ ?
Effect 
 
In the post-ǁĂƌ ƉĞƌŝŽĚ ? ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƵĂůŝƐŵ ŝŶ ĞŶŵĂƌŬ ĚŝǀŝĚĞƐ ŝŶƚŽ  ? ƉŚĂƐĞƐ ?  ‘ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂů ? ƚŝůů ƚŚĞ
 ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?  ‘ŶĞǁ ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƵĂůŝƐŵ ?  ?ƌǀŝŬ Ğƚ Ăů  ? ? ? ? ) ŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐ ĨůĞǆŝĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ĂĨƚĞƌ ƚŚĞ  ? ? ? ?Ɛ ? ĂŶĚ ŶĞŽ-
conservative market-contractualism  W ŽƌƚŚĞ  ‘ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶƐƚĂƚĞ ? during the 2010s (Petersen 2017, 
152), defined by the rise of directly punitive sanctions. The punitive turn in state governance across 
                                                        
4 Without tax subsidy, premiums on lower earners would have the effect of excluding them (Bjørn and Høj 2014, 10; 
Haagh 2013b) 
5 Within Europe, the Danish UI system applies the lowest sanctions on voluntary quits, and also operates the most 
flexible contribution requirements, and the shortest waiting period, Bjørn and Høj 2014, 9-20) 
6 The lowest value of income protection in Britain is the highest relative to the average wage in the OECD, at 70 %. 
ĞŶŵĂƌŬ ?ƐŝƐƚŚĞŶĞǆƚŚŝŐŚĞƐƚĂƚ ? ?A? ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞKĂǀĞƌ Ő Ăƚ ? ?A?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?,ĂĂŐŚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƐŝŶĐĞ
wages inequality is lower in Denmark, and in absolute terms, average wages are higher, the absolute value of the lowest 
level of income support is higher in Denmark compared with Britain. The lowest level of income support is far more 
generous in Denmark, than in any of seven most similar European countries examined. For a single person over 25 it was 
about 7,800 kr per month in 2013 after tax (Bjørn and Høj 2014, 23-24), compared with about 2,756 kr in Britain, not 
counting housing support in either case.  
7 Diamond 7 is more like the Danish system, with elements of compulsory and voluntary social and occupational 
insurance, the latter subsidized by the state. 
8 In Denmark, for instance, public funding and tripartite governance have joined up historically in defense of 
employment protection of people with reduced work ability (so-called skåne-jobs, or senior-jobs). 
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mature economies since the 1990s can be viewed as an evolutionary response to the withdrawal of 
developmental protections within production (Haagh 2018): The tendency of ubiquitous 
competition to exclude large sectors of the population that predictably follows, leads to the 
ŝŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŵŽƌĞ ĐƌƵĚĞ ŵĞĂŶƐ ƚŽ  ‘ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ ? ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ^ĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ƌĞŐŝŵĞƐ ? ŝŶ ƐŚŽƌƚ ? ĂƌĞ Ă  ‘ůĂƐƚ
resŽƌƚ ?ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚďǇĚŝƐĞŵƉŽǁĞƌĞĚƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŽ ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶ ? ?ĞůŽǁ/ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŚŽǁƚŚĞĞŵďĞĚĚĞĚƌŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚ
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂů ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚ ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ĞŶŵĂƌŬ ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶĞĚ ƚŚŝƐ ƉƵŶŝƚŝǀĞ ƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇ ďǇ  ‘ƐŽĨƚĞŶŝŶŐ ? ƚŚĞ
sanctions regime and eventually generating opposition to sanctions.  
 
As in other countries, in Denmark state-led attempts to ligthen the bureaucratic divide between 
different classes of basic benefits (e.g. basic unemployment, sick-ƉĂǇ ?  ‘ũŽď ?ƌĞĂĚǇ ? ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ
Arbejdsmarkedstyrelsen 2007, 10-14) has been under way since the early 2010s. This exemplifies 
how in general a silent transition to BI is occurring within European welfare states.  At the same 
time, the balance between market-administrative and developmental governance shapes how this is 
occurring. Implementation of British and Danish sanctions regimes since 2010 has been described as 
intense (OECD 2012), in both cases affecting about 25 per cent of benefit claimants every year 
(Adler 2016, Haagh 2018b).  However, in the UK, the roll-out of Universal Credit (simplification 
through uniting 7 different benefits) since 2014 has not led to abatement of sanctions (WPC 2017, 
Haagh 2018). By contrast, in the Danish case, a public culture of rights-scrutiny can be shown to 
have had a manifest impact on changes in the sanctions regime. Danish authorities have taken a 
lead in investigating and publishing health outcomes of sanctions, detailing the numbers receiving 
medication and effects on individuals facing homelessness or addiction to drugs, leading to 
suggestions for revision of practice (Ankestyrelsen 2017, 16-17). One public report noted that 
municipalities that had a high use of sanctions were less effective (Arbejdsmarkedstyrelsen 2008, 4-
5, 20-22), and another suggested over-complication of the system might be at stake, and sanctions 
ĂƌĞ  ‘ ?ƚŽŽ ŚĂƌƐŚ ?  ?ƌďĞũĚƐŵĂƌŬĞĚƐƚǇƌĞůƐĞŶ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?-15). In 2014, government-led investigations 
ensue in a more marked fall in sanctions following a reform of the system. As a share of 
unemployed, the number peaks at 23.9 % in 2011, and then begins gradually to fall, with a more 
marked fall in 2014, to 16.6 % of all benefit recipients.(Beskæftigelsesministeriet 2016a, 5).  
 
There is evidence that the more diverse form of developmental security in Denmark has softened 
the impact of sanctions. As distinct from Britain (Clasen 2001), Danish sanctions regimes have two 
levels, which reflect the composite character of economic security. In the UI system, less sanctions 
are given, and claimants can anticipate sanctions (Bjørn and Høj 2014), indicating a measure of 
control prevails.9  In the basic assistance (BA) system, sanctions are more frequent, but have three 
distinctive features (compared with Britain): they are shorter, and more health-contained and 
education-defined. First, in the BA system, 96 % of all sanctions are point sanctions, reducing 
benefits for up to one or two days in a month (Beskæftigelsesministeriet, 2016; Klos 2014, 20), 
compared with 81 % in the UI system (ibid. 15). Second, there is evidence social workers in 
municipalities avoid sanctioning vulnerable groups, and this explains why those sanctioned are in 
better health (Caswell et al (2011, 10).10 ? dŚŝƌĚ ? ƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ĂƌĞ ƵƐĞĚ  ‘ĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ? ? ǁŝƚŚ Ă ůĂƌŐĞ
ŶƵŵďĞƌ ?ŽǀĞƌ ? ?A? )ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚƚŽďĞůŝŶŬĞĚǁŝƚŚĂŶŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽ ‘ďƌŝŶŐƵƉ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ďƌŝŶŐǁŝƚŚŝŶ ?ǇŽƵŶŐ
                                                        
9 In 2011-1, in all 3.8 % of unemployed men, and 2.3 % of women, on UI benefits were sanctioned, compared with an 
average of sanctions of all unemployed in municipalities, of 28.8 % (Kors, 2014, 6). Within Europe, the Danish UI system 
applies the lowest sanctions on voluntary quits, and also operates the most flexible contribution requirements, and the 
shortest waiting period (Bjørn and Høj 2014, 9-20) 
10 Danish social assistance law (Parg 13 of LBK nr, 190 of 24.02.2012, Lov om Aktiv Socialpolitik) mandates concern for 
ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚƐ ?ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? 
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men in particular (Caswell et al 2011, 41). The positive role of education relative to administration in 
Denmark is shown in Graph 2 (a-c).11 
 
As discussed, aŶŽďǀŝŽƵƐƌŝƐŬŝŶďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐŝƐ ‘ůĞĂŬĂŐĞ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞďǇƚŚĞĚŝƐĐŽƵƌĂŐŝŶŐŝŵƉĂĐƚs of 
sanctions entail citizens disappear from records and lose entitlements in effect. Leakage is occurring 
but is comparably less severe in the Danish case. At its height, in 2010, self-support without income, 
(or in Danish selvforsørgelse uden indtægt), affected around 20 thousand individuals, or 15 per cent 
of the self-supporting population, and 0.6 of the economically active labour force. By 2015 the size 
of this excluded population was halved, albeit still affecting just under 2 per cent of the unemployed 
(non-student) population (Table 1). By comparison, in Britain, it is estimated non-take up of benefits 
doubles, from a third to two-thirds of individuals entitled, during the implementation of sanctions 
(The Money Charity 2016).12 
 
The lower levels of leakage in Denmark can be presumed linked with a more developmental 
administration of sanctions. In addition, the process of public scrutiny led to a gradual reversal of 
the punitive administration of sanctions. Graph 2 (a-c) shows how in 2010 Denmark rackets up its 
spending on both administration and training, in the attempt to make flexicuƌŝƚǇ  ‘ǁŽƌŬ ? ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
(typically compulsory) education. By 2014, however, this rushed response to administratively 
enforced education is somewhat contained, coinciding with a fall in sanctions (below). Meanwhile, 
the level of education spend is sustained.  
 
Eventually, state commissioning of experiment with administration of sanctions encouraged several 
municipalities to try out lifting sanctions. Kalundborg reported a doubling of activation rates after 
participation was made voluntary (Cuber 2018, Solås 2018). Aarhus municipality combined the lifting 
of conditions with external funding to offer the unemployed additional resources to support self-
employment. The processes of implementation of experiments and reasoning about sanctions 
reveal how reproduction of developmental and solidarity norms intercede. In the case of Århus, 
social workers interviewed reported how initial scepticism was overcome through implementation, 
ĂƐŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽ “ƐŝƚĚŽǁŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĐůŝĞŶƚĂƐĂŶĞƋƵĂů ?ĂƐĂĐŝƚŝǌĞŶ ?ĐĂŵĞƚŽďĞǀĂůƵĞĚ ? 13  Leaders 
within political parties supportive of sanctions report a concern that lifting sanctions should not 
ďĞĐŽŵĞĂƉĂƚŚƚŽ  ‘ŐŝǀŝŶŐƵƉ ?ŽŶƉĞŽƉůĞ  W employment services should be converted to a form of 
public outreach when activation is made voluntary (Gejl 2016). There is also evidence of solidarity 
among better-off groups within the UI system and those on basic assistance. The managing director, 
Simon Bauer, of thĞ h/ ĨƵŶĚ  ‘DŝŶ ŬĂƐƐĞ ? ŝŶ Ă ƉƵďůŝĐ ds ĚĞďĂƚĞ  ?DŝŶ -Kasse, 2012) expressed 
opposition to sanctions for both groups. An unemployed person should be thought of as 
 ‘ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ-ŚƵŶƚĞƌ ? ?ƚŽĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌĞĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐƚĂƚƵƐĂŶĚƚŚĞƐĞůĨ-motivation that Bauer believes drives 
behaviour, regardless of status.14 
 
                                                        
11 In Denmark public investigations found an average error rate of 320 per cent in muncipalies, against under 4 per cent 
in the UI system (Arbejdsstyrelsen 2012, 6-7).  
12 The manifest and growing presence of leakage in Britain, is represented in the holes at the bottom of Diamonds 1 and 
2 (Figure 3). 
13 Fredericksen (2018) and Jensen (2018).  
14 dŚĞŵĂŝŶƐƵďũĞĐƚŽĨƚŚĞĚĞďĂƚĞǁĂƐƚŚĞƐƚĂŶĚŽĨĂŶƵŶĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚĂŶŝƐŚĐŝƚŝǌĞŶ ? ‘:ŽŚŶ ? ?ŚĞĂǀŝůǇĨĞĂƚƵƌĞĚŝŶƐŽĐŝĂů
ŵĞĚŝĂ ?ǁŚŽƌĞĨƵƐĞƐƚŽƚĂŬĞ “ĂũŽďĂƚDĂĐŽŶĂůĚƐĨŽƌ ? ? ? ?ĂŶŚŽƵƌ ? ?ĂƵĞƌĚŝƐŵissed John as a typical case, but he also 
expressed sympathy with persons like John with qualifications stuck without meaningful work. His conclusion was more 
should be done to place a burden on the public to shape opportunities in society 
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In sum, taking the factors discussed into account it is plausible to argue transitions to basic income 
in Denmark are emerging from within the Danish developmental system of governing, yet this 
transition is complex. Consequently, below I discuss how conversion of basic assistance systems to 
BI would address dysfunctions in postwar welfare design, yet entrenchment of the flexicurity ideal 
imperils the occupational governance of work that has been a dynamic factor in high social equality.  
 
 
v. Developmental Governance, Flexicurity and the BI Proposal in Denmark 
 
Basic income reform  W the lifting of conditionalities and means-tests in access to basic security 
addresses short-comings in the postwar welfare model that flexicurity deepened. In the 1970s, 
debates about poverty traps linked with means-testing in Europe and America focussed on earnings 
disincentives: why give up public assistance for a paid job? As administration and compulsive 
regimes intensified after the 1990s, the poverty trap was compounded by class, security, 
administration, and ownership traps. In conditions of rising market uncertainty, the  ‘ĚƵĂů ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶ ?
model regenerated an old stygmatizing divide, between owning and non-owning citizens: means-
tests entail a person must exhaust all savings before qualifying for public assistance (as noted, in 
Denmark this illiberal policy did not obtain in the occupational system). The ownership trap keeps 
those on assistance poor and without aspirations. In addition, iƚůĞĂǀĞƐ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌ ?ŐƌŽƵƉƐŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚ
fear of losing all, as savings must be exhausted before help is at hand. Basic income would resolve 
these basically unjust and unproductive status distinctions.  
 
Consequently, /ŝƐƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ ‘ƉŝǀŽƚŝŶŐ ? ?,ĂĂŐŚ ? ? ? ? ) W Ğ ?Ő ?ŝƚƐƚĂďŝůŝƐĞƐƚŚĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ?
effective function by consolidating ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞƐƚĂƚƵƐŽĨƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶƚƉĂƌƚƐ ?^ƚĂďŝůŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ŵŽŶĞƚĂƌǇďĂƐŝƐŽĨĚĂŝůǇĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ?ŝƚĞŶĂďůĞƐŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ? ůives, and services that support such lives, 
to function better. We have very elementary evidence from experiments of this potential effect. In 
Århus, for instance, findings of a 2016/7 experiment that followed 100 unemployed who received 
development grants without conditions (mentioned above) highlighted how in a majority of cases 
some  ‘ƌĞŚĂďŝůŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? was a precondition for productive plans. This involved permission to prioritise 
spending on means to function, in the form of personal infrastructure, such as a bicycle, a computer, 
work-tools, or a driving licence, or/and spending on personal health and appearance, like dental 
treatment or glasses.15 ^ĞĐŽŶĚ ?ƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶ  ‘ŽǁŶŝŶŐ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ůĞŐĂůůǇƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚ )ǁĂƐĞǆƉŽƐĞĚĂƐĂ
major barrier to productive endeavour. In one case, where a person decided to use his development 
grant to buy a van to start a business, social workers had to consider legally take ownership of the 
van, or just  ‘ŚŝƌĞ ? it, to enable the experiment to continue.16  
 
To further understand the challenges connected with both developmental governance and basic 
income reform in Denmark it is important to appraise ŚŽǁ ‘ĨůĞǆŝĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?ŝŶĞŶŵĂƌŬĚŝĚŶŽƚǁŽƌŬ as 
prescribed. First, flexicurity failed to incorporate. If we count everyone under the age of 64 not in 
ǁŽƌŬ ? ƚŚĞ  ‘ƌĞĂů ?ŶƵŵďĞƌ ŽĨ ŶŽŶ-workers in Denmark in 2015 was around 1 million people, that is 
nearly a third of the labour force (of 3.37 million, Table 2).17 The main effect of flexicurity was to 
                                                        
15 Århus Kommune 2017.  
16 Interview with senior social workers in Århus municipality, 5th December 2016. Several other recipients wanted or 
needed to own equipment, e.g. an industrial oven to faciliate a bakery business, fitness equipment, coffee-making 
equipment, tools to support a gardening business, and so on.   Århus Kommune 2017, pp 11-13. 
17 This figure includes the rounded up data given by Danmarks Statistik of the following categories: those in receipt of 
ĞŝƚŚĞƌh/ŽƌŝŶĐŽŵĞĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƉĞƌƐŽŶƐ ) ?ƚŚŽƐĞŝŶĂĐƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŶŽƚŝŶǁŽƌŬ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ƚŚĞ ‘ƌĞƐƚŽĨƚŚĞƉ ƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ
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hollow out developmental incorporation systems without replacing them with dynamic alternatives. 
To illustrate, when Hills (2015, 38) remarks that Danish social policy became more targeted after the 
1990s, he is not wrong, except the model became more targeted not by design, but effect. The two-
tier model, based on basic combined with contributory (developmental top-up) security was not 
abandoned, but cuts in entitlement (such as from four to two years in 2010) entailed a large chunk 
of the labour market  W an estimated 80,000 persons since 2010 (Kirk 2015) fell outside the 
developmental (UI) system, becoming instead reliant on means-tested support. Table 3 shows how 
legislation to force individuals to become more job-ready facilitated the change.  This raises the 
question, is flexicurity moving Denmark towards Esping-ŶĚĞƌƐĞŶ ?Ɛ ?ŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚůǇůŽǁ-ůĞǀĞů )  ‘ĨůĂƚ-ƌĂƚĞ ?
universalism, and would basic income facilitate this transition? 
 
Second, flexicurity did not work as a market-clearing system either.  A hall-mark of flexicurity is high 
turn-over, with opening of 25 per cent of all employment positions on an annual basis. Average 
tenure is lower in Denmark than in other Nordic states. Yet, age-cohort data suggests flexicurity still 
conforms to a degree with Esping-ŶĚĞƌƐĞŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ‘^ĐŚƵŵƉĞƚĞƌŝĂŶŽŵŶŝďƵƐ ? ?Ğ ?Ő ?ƚŚĞďƵƐŽĨ
 ‘ƵŶĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞ ?  ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƐŚŽƌƚ-duration) jobs is always full, but the passengers change. Even at the 
height of flexicurity, short job duration is more markedly linked with youth status than the generic 
 ‘ĨůĞǆŝĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ƚĞƌŵ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ.18 This shows Denmark still has a developmental economy, but on a 
ĚĞƐƚĂďŝůŝƐĞĚ ďĂƐŝƐ ?  ?Dz P dŚĞ ŵĂŝŶ ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ŝƐ ŚŽǁ ĨĂƌ ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůůǇ ŚŝŐŚ  ‘ĐĂƌĞĞƌ
ŵŽďŝůŝƚǇ ?  ?KĞƐĐŚ  ? ? ? ) ? ƚŚƌŽƵŐh progress to quality jobs, and occupational stability and standing, 
remain. The period of flexicurity has seen a seminal shift away from youth entering manual 
occupational training systems, from over 40 % in the 1990s (Anker 1999), to just under 20 % in the 
late 2010s (Tesfaye 2013).19 Hence, third, it is not clear flexicurity has been a source of upgrading 
development. According to Hansen et al (2017, 4-5), businesses have responded to low-tax and 
high-fire incentives by pursuing wage compression rather than production innovation, resulting in a 
flat-productivity strategy (Productivity commission 2014, cited in Hansen et al, 4).   
 
 
v. The Politics of Alternative Basic Income Transitions in Denmark 
 
To surmise, what we are seeing in Denmark is a form of stalemate, in the form of a slow decay of 
developmental governance: Flexicurity cannot incorporate, yet the sanctions system and absence of 
 ‘ƌĞĂů ? ŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƉŽůŝĐǇ ĞŶƚĂŝůƐ Ă ŶĞǁ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ŵŽĚĞů ĐĂnnot be born. In this context, it is 
interesting to revisit the current status of developmental governance and the BI debate. 
 
First, though the developmental security tradition has been challenged, it has proven adaptable. The 
automatic linkage of union and UI membership was untied by legislation in the 1990s as part of 
liberalisation reforms. In addition, UI funds lost members by legal disqualification (above). Yet the 
fall in membership is less than expected, at around 4 per cent during the 2010s (Danmarks Statistik 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 ‘ŶŽƚ ŝŶ ǁŽƌŬ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ƚǇpically on early retirement transfers, e.g. either UI-ƌĞůĂƚĞĚ  ‘ĞĨƚĞƌůƆŶ ? Žƌ ƚŚĞ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ŽĨĞĂƌůǇ
ƌĞƚŝƌĞŵĞŶƚ ƐƚĂƚĞ ďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ?  ‘ĨƆƌƚŝĚƐƉĞŶƐŝŽŶ ? ? ůŽŶŐ-ƚĞƌŵ ƐŝĐŬ ? Žƌ ƉĞƌƐŽŶƐ ǁŚŽ  ?ƌĞŐĂƌĚ ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ĂƐ ƵŶĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚ ? ) ? ĂŶĚ
students not in work (344,000). 
18 Over 50 per cent of women in their late teens change job on an annual basis. By age 35, the share of women who do 
so is under 20 per cent, and then  W as for men  W starts to drop (Ilsøe 2017) 
19 A government target of 30 % (Jyllandsposten 2018) suggests Danish policy markers are concerned about the fall, but 
complainst about both lack of standards (Øhlenschlæger 2018) and standing (Tesfaye 2013) of manual occupations 
suggest the hollowing out of occupational policies under flexicurity have a role to play. 
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2017a). Surveys indicate many members lost as a direct result of eligibility cuts intend to return 
(Danske A-Kasser 2014). UI institutions have adjusted to adversity by extending eligibility for the 
unemployed and students (ibid).  
 
The general reasons Danish citizens have for joining developmental insurance institutions remain 
the same: The UI funds still generate a longer and more generous level of income cover.20 In the 
period October 2016 till June 2017, a fall of just under 3,000 paying (employed) members, was more 
than made up by an increase of about 10,000 young student members (Danmarks A-Kasser 2017a, 
1).21 &ŝŶĂůůǇ ? ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞ ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ ůŝŶŬĞĚǁŝƚŚ ĨĂůůŝŶŐ ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ƚŚĞ h/ĂŶĚǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ
still operate in many ways as an occupational system. In their on-line platforms UI institutions 
ĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞ ƵŶŝŽŶ ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? dŚĞ ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ? ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ŝƐ ŐƌŽǁŝŶŐ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƐĞ ŽĨ cross-
occupational unions. In sum, the evident advantages of developmental security and solidarity 
systems, combined with new low- or non-payment options - may help explain how the occupational 
systems   -despite being challenged - remain powerful inclusion structures in Denmark today. 
 
Nevertheless, the question remains how occupational systems can remain broadly inclusive in the 
face of a high level of non-employment participation, and a clientelist social transfer system that 
works more as a passification than an effective inclusion structure.  
 
On the one hand, several employers groups in Denmark have shown interest in basic income reform, 
and  W as in other countries - tie it to further flexibilisation of the market in labour. Asked to imagine 
a basic income economy, the former CEO of a large super-market chain in Denmark saw BI as 
complementing the existing system of collective frame bargaining, combined with greater flexibility 
in (local) labour relations (Josefsen 2018). Employers, he argued, would benefit, because workers 
not ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚĞĚƚŽĚŽƚŚĞũŽďƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚĐŽƵůĚůĞĂǀĞ ?ĂĚĚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚŝƐƉŽǁĞƌŽĨ  ‘Ğǆŝƚ ?ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ
ĐŽƵůĚĞǀĞŶŚŽůĚ ‘ďĂĚĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌƐ ?ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďůĞ ? 
 
This possibility is contested by labour leaders and MPs of the core left party in Denmark - 
Enhedslisten who envisage that under a future (low) basic income, workers who wish to attain an 
acceptable standard of living would be forced to work with less protections (Sørensen 2016). Any 
vulnerability would lead to exclusion. Basic income is the so-called red rose with blue thorns.22 
SorgenFrei, leader of the largest public sector unions, believes the power of collective bargaining 
structures would be eroded by high local-ůĞǀĞůĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇŝŶůĂďŽƵƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĨĞĂƌŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚĞŶĞŽ-liberals 
ǁŽƵůĚ ǁŝŶ ? ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽ (Sorgenfrei 2018). Wage bargaining has already been heavily 
decentralized in many areas in Denmark. Supposing a basic income is low, and built up systems of 
developmental security are traded for a basic income reform, it is reasonable to suppose basic 
income could erode the value of wages, the power of workers, and the wider extension of security 
systems. 
                                                        
20 The labour market remains considerably more secure for average earners in Denmark compared with other countries. 
The maximum rate to which the 90 per cent cover could go in Denmark in 2013 was 17,336 kr, compared with flat rate 
for UI contributors over 25 years in Britain of 2,756 per month, e.g. 15.9 per cent of the Danish rate.   In Denmark the 
average compensation rate of a whole unemployment period in 2011 was 67 percent (Bjørn og Høj 2014, 27-28) to 100 
% of average salary, but 88 % for those (previously) earning 2/3 of the average wage. For the UK the rates are 28 and 33 
percent. 
21 A slow seminal decline in union membership  W following the global trend  W since the 1970s has stabilised. Between 
2015 and 2016, membership grew at a very small percentage of 0.4 (Danmarks Statistik 2017a). 
22 This reference was made several times from representatives of the Danish socialist party, Enhedslisten at a conference 
on basic income in the Danish parliament on March 15th 2018.  
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 Sørensen (2016) is concerned that proposing a basic income as a form of simplification of welfare 
payments as a whole, by introducing a principle of strict equality as a dominant distributive norm, in 
practice would place many vulnerable groups at risk. In this scenario, vulnerable individuals must 
apply for additional assistance on a case by case basis, where otherwise systems might be in place 
that offer assistance and sustain wider social solidarity norms. Sørensen recommends instead an 
offensive strategy based on collective work reduction without reduced pay to a 30 hour week, 
combined with a reversal of progressive tax cuts, and an end to sanctions within both UI and basic 
assistance (ibid. 11). 
 
tŚŝůƐƚ /ĂŐƌĞĞǁŝƚŚ^ŽƌŐĞŶĨƌĞǇĂŶĚ^ƆƌĞŶƐĞŶ ?ƐŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐƚŚĞ ƌŝƐŬŽĨĂĚŝƐƉůĂĐĞŵĞŶƚ
route to basic income reform, e.g. basic income traded for the developmental systems of spend and 
regulation, I do not agree this trade-off is necessary (Haagh 2011). Sørensen wants an offensive 
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇĨŽĐƵƐƐĞĚŽŶƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶŝŶŐ ‘ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůƌŝŐŚƚƐƚŽĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŚĞĂůƚŚĂŶĚǁĞůĨĂƌĞ ? ?ĂƐŝĐŝŶĐŽŵĞ
fits within this strategy, and does not need to entail breaking with public subsidy of other 
developmental security systems.  
 
The strategy I suggest of a careful reworking of developmental systems has some similarities and 
differences with other proposals that involve a partial adaptation of flexicurity systems. As an 
example, HaŶƐĞŶĞƚĂů ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?- ? )ƌĞĐĞŶƚƐĐŚĞŵĞĨŽƌĂƌĞǀŝƚĂůŝƐĞĚ ?ƵŶĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ?ƐŝƚƵĂƚĞƐ
 ‘ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ ĨŽƌ ?/ĂƚƚŚĞďĂƐĞĂůŽŶŐǁŝƚŚĂŶĞǁĐŽŵƉƵůƐŽƌǇh/ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ǁŝƚŚĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞĨŽƌĂůůŽĨ
three month duration, and a public job guarantee (at the minimum wage). The proposal rests on a 
renewal of the old Swedish activation system, or Rehn-Meidner model, built on equalisation of 
wages in industry through collective means, placing thus the burden on employers of the cost of 
competition and economic adjustment (ibid., 5). dŚĞŬĞǇŵĞƌŝƚŽĨ,ĂŶƐĞŶĞƚĂů ?ƉƌŽƉŽƐĂů ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ
sets the employment and unemployment systems together. It is a systemic proposal that by scope 
recognizes how the economy functions as a governance system.  Moreover, it recognizes the 
unsustainable character of a competition model based in bare labour flexibility. Yet the question is 
whether a more radical break with the flexicurity model is required.  
 
,ĂŶƐĞŶĞƚĂů ?ƐŵŽĚĞůƌĞůŝĞƐŽŶĂŚŝŐŚůĞǀĞůŽĨůĂďŽƵƌŵĂƌŬĞƚ-readiness, and to that end continues to 
cut life-course security in favour of enhancing labour mobility. A three-month UI cover for all is 
comparably very short. In addition, the premise individuals should choose UBI or activation 
generates a direct form of state administration of employment transitions which opens the door to 
reintroducing behaviour controls down the line: their proposal in fact is not a UBI scheme, in the 
sense that a UBI is not continuous or guaranteed separately and through the life course.  Hansen et 
al rely on raising wages as an innovation-inducing strategy.  This to some extent shuts over the 
extent to which high effective economic stability in society and for individuals in Nordic states 
emerged historically through the democratic development of shared property rights in stability. E.g. 
it was through public owning of both the rules (developmental governing) and the resources (public 
finance and services) that a comparably high level of effective freedom evolved. 
 
By historical comparison, a downside of the Swedish Rehn-Meidner model was its curtailment of 
autonomy: individuals could be forced to move towns to continue to enjoy social benefits.   An 
alternative is to rely on some features of the Rehn-Meidner model, specifically the stabilisation of 
production factors, through securing the rights-foundation of shared resources combined with new 
ways of tying collective development planning with reviving occupation economies. A wider reform 
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(and stabilisation) of money economies, such as proposed by Christensen (2019, 90-91) is a solid 
basis for reworking developmentalism and the rights-based public services tradition in a way basic 
income fits within it. The idea of basic income sitting within a wider collective reclaiming of 
development is not radical in a Nordic context. An oft-forgotten historic aspect of Nordic public 
policy is heavy regulation of land and national ownership of natural resources (Sanders et al 2016), 
and of course public money (Ferguson 2008, 48-49, 125). On some accounts the popular money 
economy, that is, the dissemination of property ownership and the wide circulation of money, was 
not an Anglo-liberal but Nordic invention (Sandberg 1978). In this sense, democratic (liberal) 
capitalism is in fact quintessentially Nordic. In all, a ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐ/ŝƐŵŽƌĞůŝŬĞůǇƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ,ĂŶƐĞŶ ?Ɛ
goal of raising the (effective) wage level, although the quid pro quo is greater reliance on non-wage 
(such as developmental, social, and occupational) incentives to encourage contribution to society on 
a voluntary basis. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In summary, four broad points may be drawn from my discussion of the role of basic income in 
contemporary welfare state transformation in Denmark.   First, an Equality Paradox may explain why 
basic income is emerging more rapidly in high equality countries such as Denmark, in which 
developmental incorporation translates universalism de jure into high levels of inclusion de facto. 
Second, however, the forces that in this argument make universalism effective and sustainable are 
under increasing strain. However, we can see that competing forces are playing themselves out in 
the context of state administration of flexicurity policy.  
 
Denmark can be considered a  ‘best-ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ?ĐĂƐĞĨŽƌ/ƌĞĨŽƌŵŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĂƚŚŝŐŚƚĂǆĂŶĚƐƉĞŶĚ
on social transfer combined with education makes it plausible. Hence, third, the Danish case 
ŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞƐŬĞǇďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚĨĂĐƚŽƌƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞƐŚĂƉŝŶŐ  ‘ƌĞĂů- ŝĨĞ ? transition to basic income within and 
beyond Europe today. European states are stumbling towards basic income almost unconsciously, as 
those in charge of social transfer systems are trying to streamline systems based in increasingly 
complicated and randomised labour stratifications. In this context, basic income can be a catalyst for 
two quite different developments, either a reworking of developmental governance or a further 
extension of the market. The concern in the second case is that if  W in the Danish case - a BI were to 
be traded for a further corrosion of developmental security it would become in effect - if not by 
design - a targeted anti-poverty scheme, defined by those depending on it enjoying an overall much 
lower share of social resources. This ĂůƐŽĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ƚŚĂƚ ƉĂƌĂĚŽǆŝĐĂůůǇ /
suffers in Nordic states.   
 
In overall summary, basic income is a rational response to the punitive character and administrative 
inefficiencies of means-tested benefit systems. BI can be considered necessary to rescue modern 
market democracies. To the extent such systems are predicated on effective incorporation, large-
scale, diversified support systems are necessary. If such systems  W as in the case of means-tested 
assistance  W prevent individuals from owning, saving and affiliating on a stable and equal basis with 
others such systems will corrode from within, as states are assisting markets in excluding citizens. 
The fact that this is also happening - ĂůďĞŝƚŝŶĂŵŽƌĞ ‘ĂƐƐŝƐƚĞĚ ?ǁĂǇ- in high equality countries like 
Denmark is a powerful argument for BI reform. At the same time, basic income does not itself 
address market inequalities, or the way such inequalities reinforces socially punitive governance 
over time. In the Danish case, the developmental tradition contained the punitive character of the 
15 
 
ƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?ďŽƚŚŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůůǇĂŶĚƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇ ?zĞƚ ?ĨůĞǆŝĐƵƌŝƚǇĂůƐŽĚƌĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĞ
tradition that made this mode of governing initially plausible. The direction of basic income debate 
and transformation in Denmark therefore remains to be seen. What we can predict with certainty is 
that the fate of basic income and developmental governance are bound up with each other. 
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Table 1 Self-supporting population ʹ with and without private and public income 
 
Year 
           A 
Economically  
Active  
Population 
           B 
Self-supporting  
without income  
or  
public support  
          C 
Unemployed  
population 
a. Brutto /  
b. on transfers  
not in work, 
excluding those  
in study 
c. b, but  
including those 
 in study 
          D 
Self-
supporting  
without 
income,  
public 
support, 
transfers  
from  
own 
enterprise 
 D as % of   
   Ca,    Cb,     B ,    A 
   a.           b.           c.   
2010 3,348.200 129,300 163,454       20,151  12,3     -       15,6   0.6 
2011 3,344.400 130,000 159,241 17,654    
2012 3,339.300 132,600 161,236 13,483  
2013 3,339.000 132,100 153,082 11,947  
2014 3,349.800 134,200 133,243    11,684  
2015 3,367.700 134,700 122,519   656,000  1000,000* 10,971   8,95   1,67    8,1  0.32 
2016 3,394.200 137,600  -  
Change  
2010- 
2016 
     
* This number includes the rounded up figures given by Danmarks Statistik of the following categories: those in receipt 
ŽĨ ĞŝƚŚĞƌ h/ Žƌ ŝŶĐŽŵĞ ĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ƉĞƌƐŽŶƐ ) ? ƚŚŽƐĞ ŝŶ ĂĐƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŶŽƚ ŝŶ ǁŽƌŬ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ƚŚĞ  ‘ƌĞƐƚ ŽĨƚŚĞ
population no in work ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƚǇƉŝĐĂůůǇŽŶĞĂƌůǇƌĞƚŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƐ ?Ğ ?Ő ?ĞŝƚŚĞƌh/-ƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ‘ĞĨƚĞƌůƆŶ ?ŽƌƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵŽĨ
ĞĂƌůǇ ƌĞƚŝƌĞŵĞŶƚ ƐƚĂƚĞ ďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ? ?  ‘ĨƆƌƚŝĚƐƉĞŶƐŝŽŶ ? ? ůŽŶŐ-ƚĞƌŵ ƐŝĐŬ ? Žƌ ƉĞƌƐŽŶƐ ǁŚŽ ?ƌĞŐĂƌĚ ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ĂƐ ƵŶĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚ ? ) ?
and students not in work (344,000). Source: Beskæftigelsesudvalget 2017, BEU Alm.del Bilag 250 Offentligt 2016/7, 
 http://www.ft.dk/samling/20161/almdel/BEU/bilag/250/1765825.pdf, and Danmarks Statistik 2016: Stigning I 
arbejdsstyrken, https://www.dst.dk/da/Statistik/nyt/NytHtml?cid=20990 
 
Table 2 Labour Market Incorporation, thousands 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
  1.000 persons 
15-64 labour force 3608 3618 3620 3615 3613 3616 3628 3645 
 
2911 2904 2874 2866 2842 2826 2833 2861 
Employed 2810 2727 2656 2645 2623 2624 2641 2680 
Full-time 2150 2048 1984 1987 1977 1983 1996 2022 
Part-time 660 679 672 658 646 640 646 658 
Job-ready 101 177 218 221 218 202 191 180 
Seeking fulltime 73 135 165 164 162 150 142 137 
Seeking part-time 29 42 53 56 56 52 50 44 
Outside the labour 
force 
697 714 747 749 771 791 795 785 
Desire employment 135 149 161 189 178 182 203 176 
Does not desire 
employment 
562 566 585 560 594 609 592 609 
Source: Beskæftigelsesudvalget, Bilag 250, 2. June, 2017, anf Danmarks Statistik: Stigning I arbejdsstyrken, 
https://www.dst.dk/da/Statistik/nyt/NytHtml?cid=20990 
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Table 3 Legal Adjustments to UI Benefit Entitlements 
2006 2010 2011 2012 2017 The  
2025 plan 
Qualifying  
age for  
 ‘ƉŽƐƚ-ǁĂŐĞ ?
entitlement  
raised to 62 
Halving of 
Period of 
entitlement  
from 4 to  
2 years 
 ‘WŽƐƚ-ǁĂŐĞ ?
entitlement  
Period cut  
from 5 to 3  
years 
Tax  
deductions for  
those in work  
raised, the real  
value of  
 ‘ĂǇƉĂǇ ?h/ 
benefits is  
reduced 
Minor  
change  
considered, 
repeal  
holiday-daypay 
savings  
Plans to double the  
contribution  
made by the UI system  
to the state. The  
government rationale is  
that digitalisation of the  
system has or will entail 
savings 
Pension ag
raised to 67 
Minimum 
contribution 
period  
doubled  
from  
6 months  
to 1 year 
Deductions  
against 
pensions  
introduced 
The value of  
 ‘ĂǇƉĂǇ ?ŝƐ 
regulated to  
increase  
at a lower rate  
than wages,  
at about a  
10 % difference 
 ‘  ‘^ĞŶŝŽƌũŽďƐ ?
shall no longer be covered by  
collective  
bargaining  
wages-levels, but  
set at highest  
 ‘ĚĂǇƉĂǇ ?ƌĂƚĞ 
Average-age 
Retirement 
Principle 
introduced  
 Many lose  
effective  
entitlement  
because 
pensions are 
house-hold  
means-tested, but
 ‘ƉŽƐƚ ?ǁĂŐĞ ?
entitlements  
are not 
At the same  
time, scope f
extending  
 ‘ĚĂǇƉĂǇ ?
for another  
year is 
 introduced 
 Plans to further  
extend  
the tax  
measures  
introduced in 2012 
Sources: Danske A-Kasser and Danmarks Statistik 
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